Infl ation targeting as a monetary regime began in the developed world, but over the last 20 years, many developing and transition economies have also adopted this framework. Since then, infl ation targeting has resulted in lower infl ation levels and persistence, and it will likely survive the ongoing crisis. 1 However, critics have pointed out that infl ation targeting is too focused on infl ation, overlooking other worthy goals like employment, and that it will likely fail to ameliorate the ongoing crisis. 2 In addition, infl ation targeting in developing economies faces some distinct challenges like institutional weaknesses, high currency substitution, fi scal and fi nancial dominance, and the high exchange rate pass-through. 3 However, Mishkin argues that a country should not necessarily resolve these weaknesses prior to adopting infl ation targeting, but rather should improve them afterwards. 4 Indeed, many developing countries adopted infl ation targeting after turbulence in the foreign exchange market, forgoing the chance to improve the economic environment prior to infl ation targeting. 5 The exchange rate pass-through is defi ned as a change in domestic prices resulting from a unitary change in the nominal exchange rate. Many studies have documented the high exchange rate pass-through to prices in developing economies. 6 This would imply that monetary policy might be ineffective in combating "imported" infl ation, i.e. the central bank would increase the interest rate, which would suffocate the real activity but would not bring infl ation down. 7 So the high passthrough may jeopardise the attainment of the infl ation target and, under larger supply shocks, may be accompanied by a protracted recession. This is the source of fear shown lately by Stiglitz 8 and Frankel 9 that infl ation targeting will certainly fail, as it was not designed to manage "imported" infl ation due to the high pass-through.
Inflation Targeting
While the literature on the exchange rate pass-through is quite exhaustive, 10 the literature on the pass-through under infl ation targeting has evoked less attention. 11 No empirical research has been done for transition economies, and there had been no attempt to put the issue in the context of the crisis in order to test Stiglitz's claim that infl ation targeting is destined to fail.
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The objective of this paper is to assess the exchange rate pass-through in a set of transition economies in Central and South Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in the light of infl ation targeting and the ongoing economic crisis.
Literature overview
The literature on the exchange rate pass-through is quite comprehensive: an early survey of both the theoretical and empirical literature is done by Menon, 13 while more recent contributions include, for example, Gust et al. 14 and An and Wang. 15 One strand of this literature, arguably led by Klaus SchmidtHebbel, showed that the exchange rate pass-through is higher in emerging economies, likely due to the lower credibility of their central banks, leading agents to perceive temporary exchange rate shocks as permanent. 16 The literature on the pass-through under infl ation targeting has received less attention. 17 This, though, does not refl ect the importance of the issue in emerging economies: having a higher pass-through than developed economies may jeopardise the achievement of their infl ation target, as Stiglitz 18 and Frankel 19 have pointed out.
However, research suggests that the exchange rate passthrough considerably declined under infl ation targeting, mainly because of the credibility gained by monetary authorities under infl ation targeting 20 and the generally more favourable economic environment in both advanced and emerging economies. The former claim is largely supported by Taylor's argument that in a low-infl ation environment -achieved by infl ation targeting -fi rms expect infl ation deviations to be less persistent and would therefore pass on less of an exchange rate-induced increase in the price of imported inputs to their selling prices. 21 The empirical literature shows that infl ation targeting helped to reduce infl ation. 22 According to Taylor's hypothesis, this should have led to a reduction of the exchange rate passthrough. 23 Indeed, some argue that just before the current crisis and food price shocks, the low-infl ation environment explained some of the pass-through reduction. 24 Others argue that the pass-through in emerging markets declined according to their development paths, which were associated with the changing composition of their imports. 25 Reyes ascribes the lower pass-through in infl ation-targeting developing economies to substantial foreign exchange interventions, which likely reduced the correlation between infl ation and the exchange rate. 26 The empirical literature largely confi rms these notions. Coulibaly and Kempf investigate the reaction of the exchange rate pass-through to prices in infl ation-targeting and non-targeting countries in a panel VAR framework. 27 They fi nd that the adoption of infl ation targeting reduces the pass-through to consumer prices, import prices and producer prices, while no signifi cant change in the pass-through could be identifi ed for Inflation Targeting non-targeters. In addition, they fi nd that the contribution of exchange rate shocks to price fl uctuations in targeting countries has decreased since the adoption of infl ation targeting, while the contribution of exchange rate shocks to price fl uctuations in non-targeting countries has increased. Similarly, Nogueira, 28 using the ARDL approach fi nds that the pass-through is higher in emerging economies than in developed economies and that it has decreased since the adoption of infl ation targeting. However, no research has investigated how the pass-through has evolved in infl ation-targeting economies during the current crisis. This contribution aims to fi ll this gap.
Methodology and data
In order to assess the exchange rate pass-through in transition economies, we design the following regression:
where π it stands for infl ation, y it denotes GDP growth, е it is the exchange rate depreciation, u i is a country-specifi c error term, and ε it is the idiosyncratic error which is assumed to be independently and identically distributed. With certain variations, this estimation model is commonly used in the respective literature. 29 Our main interest is to estimate the β 2 coeffi cient, which measures the response of domestic infl ation to a unitary change in the exchange rate. As the change in the exchange rate is here taken as a depreciation, we would expect a positive β 2 coeffi cient.
Since our objective is to assess the exchange rate passthrough under infl ation targeting and during the crisis, we need to augment Equation 1 with three level-shift and three slope-shift (interaction) dummy variables, as shown in Table 1 .
In addition to these dummies, we add the log of the imports value as a robustness check, as argued by Ganapolsky and Vilan, 30 to capture the impact of changes in foreign producer costs on the local currency price of imports.
The econometric challenge in estimating Equation 1 is that of reverse causality. For instance, if infl ation and exchange rate depreciation are measured contemporaneously, a positive coeffi cient on the latter can be obtained because it affects infl ation positively, but also because higher infl ation leads to depreciation. Reverse causality can lead to wrong inference. We therefore consider an instrumental variables (IV) estima-28 R.P. N o g u e i r a , op. cit. 29 I. G o l d f a j n , S. We r l a n g : The pass-through from depreciation to infl ation: a panel study, Central Bank of Brazil WP05, 2000; J. R e y e s : Infl ation Targeting in Emerging Countries …, op. cit. 30 E. G a n a p o l s k y, D.S. V i l a n : Buy foreign while you can: the cheap dollar and exchange rate pass-through 
Estimation results and discussion
The estimation results are given in Table 2 . Note that the table reports the cumulative coeffi cients for the pass-through effect, along with their cumulative signifi cance. The cumulative coeffi cients are obtained by adding up the respective coeffi cients, 31 while the cumulative signifi cance is obtained from the Wald test. All statistics presented are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. According to the Hansen test, instruments are valid in all specifi cations. Column 1 presents the basic specifi cation, while columns 2 to 4 add the 31 For example, the coeffi cient on "depreciation under infl ation targeting" is in fact a sum of the coeffi cients on "depreciation" and on "depreciation under infl ation targeting" obtained in the specifi cation. Infl ation performance and exchange rate pass-through under infl ation targeting during the crisis as compared to non-infl ationtargeting transition economies and to the non-crisis period Table 2 Estimation results groups of level-shift and interaction dummies as specifi ed in Table 1 . Column 5 adds the log of imports. The coeffi cients remain relatively stable across the different model specifi cations.
Inflation Targeting
Results suggest that the exchange rate pass-through in transition economies is quite high, ranging from a 0.7 to 1.1 percentage point increase in infl ation when the exchange rate depreciates by one percentage point. The fi nding is consistent with the argumentation and fi ndings in Schmidt-Hebbel and Werner. 32 Infl ation targeting contributed to reducing infl ation by about eight percentage points on average compared to non-infl ation-targeting transition economies, while the passthrough under infl ation targeting declined to about 0.2 percentage points, suggesting about a fourfold reduction. This can certainly be ascribed to the acquired monetary credibility and better management of shocks under infl ation targeting and is largely in line with the fi ndings of earlier studies.
33
As concerns over the resistance of infl ation targeting to shocks are pertinent to the current crisis, columns 3 to 5 add the crisis effect, highlighting the contribution of the current paper to the sparsity of knowledge. Not surprisingly, although infl ation dwindles during the global crisis, refl ecting the largely depressed prices, the pass-through soars to almost double the levels seen before the crisis (see column 3). Eichengreen argues that the high pass-through is due to the lack of credibility of the monetary authorities, which leads to a general belief among economic agents that temporary exchange rate shocks during a crisis are of a permanent nature. 34 This argumentation is not unfamiliar to the non-infl ation-targeting transition economies, as a majority of them maintain rigid exchange rates, precisely due to the lack of credibility of their central banks and the fear of fl oating. 35 That this result might be stemming from the non-infl ation-targeting transition economies is evident from column 4, whereby the effect for infl ation-targeting countries during the crisis is estimated separately (so that the crisis dummies represent the effect for noninfl ation-targeting economies) and is of the same magnitude as in column 3. Interestingly, the pass-through for the infl ationtargeting economies during the crisis is of similar magnitude to the whole period under infl ation targeting: there is no statistical difference, according to the respective test statistics (not shown but available on request). On the other hand, the difference between the pass-through during crisis in infl ationtargeting and non-infl ation-targeting transition economies is statistically signifi cant at the fi ve per cent level.
These results are further confi rmed in column 5, which shows a positive effect of imports upon infl ation, refl ecting the positive impact of the changes in foreign producer costs on the local currency price of imports. The inclusion of this variable somewhat reduces the pass-through under infl ation targeting and under infl ation targeting during the crisis, but the coefficients are similar in magnitude to those shown in columns 3 and 5.
Conclusion
The fi ndings of this study suggest that the exchange rate pass-through in transition economies is quite high. However, infl ation targeters achieved a pass-through that was nearly four times lower, and they maintained it during the global crisis. It was likely due to their acquired monetary credibility, but also due to factors such as the changing composition of imports, exchange rate monitoring and intervention in the foreign exchange market when necessary. On the other hand, for non-infl ation targeters, the pass-through increased during the crisis. This increase is likely due to temporary exchange rate shocks being perceived by agents as permanent.
N o t e : *, ** and *** denote signifi cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
S o u r c e : Own calculation based on IMF data. 
